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 The concept of “grand strategy” is both an overall plan that encompasses the military, 
diplomatic, economic, and social aspects of waging war, and an analytical lens through which we 
can examine the progression of historical conflicts and obtain a more comprehensive 
understanding of why they were fated the way they were. The American Civil War is a truly 
massive specimen that is frequently analyzed in smaller proportions that do not do the complex 
and fluid nature of the conflict justice. Too often are inflated importances given to individual 
battles and people. Examining the grand strategies of the Union and Confederacy - whether 
intentional or not - yields a clearer picture of how the war reached its outcome, and assigns the 
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He became not a man but a member. He felt that something of which he was a part - a regiment, 
an army, a cause, or a country - was in a crisis. He was welded into a common personality which 
was dominated by a single desire. 
- Stephen Crane, The Red Badge of Courage 
 
 
“What a piece of work is man… in action how like an angel!” And the old man, grinning, had 
scratched his head and then said stiffly, “Well, boy, if he’s an angel, he’s sure a murderin’ 
angel.” 
- Michael Shaara, The Killer Angels 
 
 
It is well that war is so terrible, otherwise we should grow too fond of it. 
- Robert E. Lee at the Battle of Fredericksburg, 1862 
 
 
I will fight until Hell freezes over and then fight on the ice! 
- Union captain William Mattingly at the Battle of Bulltown, 1863 
 
 
Table of Contents 
1. Introduction ............................................................................................................................... 1 
2. What is “Grand Strategy?” ...................................................................................................... 6 
3. Prelude to War ......................................................................................................................... 10 
4. The Secession Crisis ................................................................................................................ 18 
5. The Motivational Impact on Strategy .................................................................................... 21 
6. War and Diplomacy in 1861 ................................................................................................... 26 
7. March - August, 1862 .............................................................................................................. 33 
8. Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation .................................................................... 35 
9. Gettysburg and the Erlanger Loan ........................................................................................ 41 
10. Grant, Sherman, Abolition, and the End of the Line ......................................................... 45 
11. Conclusion .............................................................................................................................. 48 
Complete Works Cited ................................................................................................................ 52 
 
 Hammer 1 
1. Introduction 
In May of my freshman year of high school, I went on my first date with my first 
girlfriend ever. It was a simple coffee date to our local Barnes & Noble with two mutual friends 
who had already been dating for more than a year to that point. There was no solid plan for the 
outing, and we expected it to last no more than an hour. 
 We all arrived separately - none of us were quite ready for our parents to know about our 
relationships yet - and I after the three of them. They secured a table on the balcony overlooking 
the entrance, and waved and hollered at me as I stepped out of my mother’s car. I told them that I 
would be right up after grabbing something from the coffee shop, and proceeded to keep them 
waiting another thirty minutes as I shuffled around the store, my nose in a particularly interesting 
book I spied on the bargain table. It turned out to be one of the most fateful chance encounters of 
my life. 
 When I finally joined my friends, I was pummeled with questions about what took me so 
long, why I did not have a beverage with me, and what the book was in my hand. I swallowed 
my embarrassment from having kept my new girlfriend waiting half an hour while I perused a 
book about strategy in the American Civil War, and I apologized. While they were all 
unimpressed that that was the book that kept them waiting for such a long time, I dated that girl 
for another three years - on and off, of course - so my first date faux pas clearly did not leave a 
lasting impression on her. But it did on me. 
 To be honest, I do not remember the name of that book. I am not sure I ever learned the 
name of it. I can barely remember what the cover looked like. I just remember the fully-
illustrated and thoroughly annotated diagrams of the major battles of the Civil War. It was 
probably one of a thousand books of its kind, but it was monumental to me. I grew up in love 
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with the Civil War, with the image of two massive bodies of blue and gray clashing back and 
forth across an open field, while a triumphant symphony blasted somewhere in the background. I 
was infatuated with how sweeping, epic, and romantic it all seemed to be. As a child, I read The 
Red Badge of Courage and The Killer Angels, and watched their film adaptations dozens of times 
over. I had visited the Gettysburg, Petersburg, and Antietam battlefields by the time I was 
fourteen. I dressed up as a Union soldier for Halloween on more than one occasion. It was an 
obsession, to be sure, but this book - this mundane, straightforward, cartographic representation 
of these mythical events - turned it into a passion. This was the book I had been waiting my 
whole life to find. 
 From an academic standpoint, I was interested almost exclusively in the strategy of the 
conflict. I wanted to know how the battles unfolded, not who ran against Lincoln in 1860 or 
about his relationship with Frederick Douglass. I cared not for the individual figures and politics 
of the era. I wanted to see two giant armies shooting at each other, trying to outdo the other, and 
this book presented me with every major scenario, with the strategy meticulously rendered and 
explained on each page. I bought and consumed it, and it damn near ended my first relationship 
before it even had a chance to begin! It quickly became the best and most-read thing on my 
bookshelf. 
 I lost that book and everything else when my home in Ventura, California burned down 
in the wildfire that ravaged the county in December 2017. My family was okay, thankfully, but 
there were a lot of memories in that house that I will never see again. I think about that book 
often. I think about how perfect it was, and how rare it is to come across something that so 
satisfies you the way that book satisfied me. I think about how that book is responsible for the 
thesis you are reading right now, not only because it ignited my intense love for the Civil War, 
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but because it awakened in me an interest in the overarching concept of strategy. It was this 
awakening that inspired me to enroll in Dr. Austin Bay’s Junior Seminar course on military 
strategy, entitled “War Games.” Here, I was quickly made aware of how little I knew about the 
subject with which I had spent most of my life being enamored. 
 Before, I had always considered “strategy” and “tactics” to be one-and-the-same. They 
are not. Strategy, as it is commonly defined with regard to war, is the “science and art of military 
command exercised to meet the enemy in combat under advantageous conditions.”1 Contrasted 
with tactics, which are simply the “science and art of disposing and maneuvering forces in 
combat,”2 strategy encompasses the objectives and plans of an entire war or operation, not solely 
the actions undertaken in a specific battle or part of a battle. For example, Operation Overlord 
had an overall strategy of launching massive airborne and amphibious assaults on the beaches of 
Normandy, to break through the German defense of the French coast and provide the Allies with 
an unfettered access point to send new troops and supplies to their armies marauding in the 
heartland. The use of Bangalore torpedoes to breach the seawall on Omaha Beach was a tactic, a 
small but vital component of that overall strategy. Strategy is a broad, overarching plan to 
achieve a primary objective. Tactics are the individual means through which a strategy is 
realized. This is an overly simple distinction, but it is one I did not learn until I was a junior in 
college. 
 Furthermore, Dr. Bay introduced me to the concept of “grand strategy,” which extends 
beyond military affairs to incorporate political, social, and economic factors into an overall 
strategy. I will elaborate more later, but suffice it to say this concept reshaped my understanding 
of everything from the conquests of Hannibal and Alexander the Great, to the U.S. presidency as 
 
1 “Strategy.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/strategy. 
2 “Tactics.” Merriam-Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/tactics. 
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a whole and the process of rebuilding a Major League Baseball franchise like the Houston 
Astros. It is a broadly applicable analytical lens and it has the ability to provide a more 
comprehensive understanding of large-scale events. In my mind, the event that stands to gain the 
most from this approach is the Civil War, so I was compelled to write my term paper for Dr. 
Bay’s course as a critical reanalysis of key moments in the conflict, specifically battles like 
Antietam and Gettysburg. My goal was the reassess the value and importance that has been 
placed on different events in the war, and how, by viewing them through the lens of grand 
strategy - instead of traditional tactical significance - it could be determined that the most 
important moment of the war - the so-called “turning point” - was actually in September 1862, 
not July 1863.  
 From this clumsy first attempt, my thesis was born. I subsequently enrolled in Dr. Robert 
Icenhauer-Ramirez’s course on the Civil War and Reconstruction in the fall of my senior year. It 
was the first course on the topic I had had the opportunity to take in my academic career, and as 
the semester progressed, I realized that even at the university level it is hard to achieve a truly 
holistic approach to historical analysis, especially when the subject is as massive as the 
American Civil War. The incredible scope of the conflict makes it particularly convoluted and 
difficult to assess wholly. Breaking it down into eras, regions, battles, and people makes it easier 
to digest, and more accessible to students. However, I do not feel this approach does the intricate, 
fluid nature of the conflict justice. Much like how World War II is usually divided into European 
and Pacific theaters, the Civil War is divided into the Antebellum, War, and Reconstruction eras, 
and Eastern and Western theaters. The battles are individually analyzed and specific people are 
held responsible for specific events. Analyzed in a vacuum, these eras, regions, battles, and 
people do not provide an understanding of the war as a whole. Again, there is nothing “wrong” 
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with the individualized approach - as in there is nothing inherently incorrect or deceitful about it 
- but I feel it does a disservice to the natural ebb and flow of the conflict - how every action from 
every battle, speech, proclamation, publication, diplomatic mission, and economic transaction 
conducted in the name of the war affected its course. I decided that, in order to do justice to the 
subject I love so dearly, I needed to expand my thesis’ inquiry. I needed to offer a fresh, cohesive 
reevaluation of the nature of the Civil War, as a whole. 
 This is an admittedly an ambitious task, but that is where grand strategy comes into play. 
Viewing the conflict through the lens of grand strategy affords the consolidation of the 
aforementioned aspects, by examining how the Union and Confederacy sought to win the war 
from the outset, and how their strategies evolved - or stagnated - over the course of four years of 
fighting. This will reveal at what points their mentalities changed, and what events triggered, and 
were triggered by, these shifts. This will provide a more organic view of the war in its totality, 
and a new outlook on its progression. The culmination was the sum of many different parts; what 
determined the fate of the Union and Confederacy was how they conducted themselves across 
the board, not the arbitrary outcomes of specific events. Demolishing the habit of assigning 
linear importances to things is key to organizing and constructing a cohesive picture of the 
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2. What is “Grand Strategy?” 
The problem I seek to rectify is not one that stems from a lack of analysis. Indeed, the 
Civil War is the most studied and written-about episode of American history, with an estimated 
50,000 books devoted to understanding the incredible bloodshed and dramatic upheaval of our 
society. 
“There have been histories of single years, single campaigns, single battles, and single 
days of single battles,” writes Graham, “as well as studies from any number of racial, ethnic, 
gender, and national perspectives. Virtually every aspect of the war has at least one book devoted 
to it, and there are few episodes of American history that we know as much about.”3 
 The goal of this thesis is not to discover new information or present new ideas about a 
war that concluded nearly 155 years ago. Rather, it is to gather the information we already have 
in abundance and assemble a new kind of examination of the conflict. As previously stated, this 
will be done by analyzing the overarching, grand strategy of both armies and their associated 
governments. In order to do this, however, a better understanding of what “grand strategy” is 
must first be established. 
 According to the great Prussian strategist General Carl von Clausewitz, war was “merely 
the continuation of policy by other means.”4 It was one instrument with which strategic ends 
could be met, and other forms of policy should exist alongside it in terms of importance, and our 
willingness to default to it. This was the foundation for the concept of “grand strategy,” upon 
which historian B.H. Liddell Hart elaborated in his 1954 work Strategy as being the “policy that 
guides the conduct of war.” More precisely, “the role of grand strategy… is to co-ordinate and 
 
3 Graham, T. Austin. A History of American Civil War Literature, edited by Coleman Hutchison, Cambridge 
University Press, 2016, ch. 11. 
4 Von Clausewitz, Carl. On War. Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1984, p. 87. 
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direct all of the resources of a nation… toward the attainment of the political object of the war.”5 
Grand strategy does not solely concern itself with military endeavors - troop movements, 
fortifications, reconnaissance, et cetera. As Hart posits, it is the convergence of the economic, 
diplomatic, commercial, ethical, and military aspects of waging war, as well as what comes after 
the conflict. It is an understanding of the totality of war, a fuller picture of something that is often 
reduced to on-field action and tactical repercussions. 
 While it is clear that Hart refers to grand strategy as a conscious creation of militaries and 
governments, Dr. Bay framed it as a useful lens through which we can analyze the overall 
functions of militaries and governments from eras before grand strategy was a concept. This 
helps provide a more comprehensive analysis of why wars turned out the way they did, looking 
beyond individual tactical victories to the triumphs and failures of governmental structure, 
economic status, and social involvement. Some excellent examples of this critical method can be 
found in Bryan N. Groves’ 2010 article, “The Multiple Faces of Effective Grand Strategy.” He 
analyzes the reigns of Phillip II of Spain and Elizabeth I of England, and the varying degrees to 
which they unknowingly applied the Clausewitzian principle of war-policy harmony in their 
conduct. 
 Phillip II sought to restore Catholic dominance in England and increase his religion’s 
influence across Western Europe. He perceived himself as a divine instrument of God in 
realizing a greater destiny, and embarked upon an ill-fated naval campaign to conquer the 
English Isles. The expedition was marred by insufficient food stores and his unwillingness to 
assemble a bureaucratic chain of command, where his commanders were free to make the 
“operational decisions necessary to ensure success.” Instead, “they sought guidance from Phillip, 
 
5 Liddell Hart, B.H. Strategy, Second Revised Edition. New York, Fredrick A. Praeger Publishers, 1967, p. 335. 
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but often did not obtain a timely answer due to the time lag associated with couriers and from 
Phillip’s inefficient information processing.” Consequently, “these failures… contributed 
significantly to the rout of his Armada by Elizabeth I.” Even though Phillip was willing to 
“subordinate military means to reach his political objectives,”6 as Clausewitz recommended, “he 
did not use the means necessary to successfully accomplish it.” Phillip believed his divine 
ordainment and superior economy and navy were enough to defeat the English, but completely 
ignored the capacity of human error and necessity of efficient administration to wage war. Thus, 
he failed. 
 Groves also analyzes the opposite side of this engagement, remarking how Elizabeth’s 
approach was almost entirely different from Phillip’s. She understood the dynamic of power 
within her realm, “remaining unmarried and… abstaining from wars that did not suit England, 
[so as not to be] drawn into wars simply for dynastic reasons… [as well as] avoid overstretching 
her [relatively weak] nation.”7 She also decentralized the command of her naval forces, allowing 
her commanders to develop and enact their own strategies for continuously tormenting the 
Spanish, to the point where their attack on England had to be delayed by a year. This efficiency 
of command allowed them to weaken their enemy so much that when their attack finally came, it 
was ineffectual, and England survived with minimal casualties. Elizabeth considered and  
understood the various aspects that go into igniting a war, and how each aspect served her 
overall goal of strengthening her nation’s position in England. 
 The decision to wage war is complex. It is rooted in every facet of society, not just the 
battlefield. Nowhere is this more evident than the American Civil War. Minimal studies have 
 
6 Groves, Bryan N. “The Multiple Faces of Effective Grand Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 
2010, p. 6. 
7 Groves, Bryan N. “The Multiple Faces of Effective Grand Strategy.” Journal of Strategic Security, vol. 3, no. 2, 
2010, p. 6. 
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been conducted about the grand strategies of the conflict, with the one of the foremost being Dr. 
Donald Stoker’s The Grand Design, from which I pull much analysis for this thesis. However, it 
is the relative lack of studies, and the realization that the Civil War exemplifies grand strategy, 
that led me to right this wrong. By thoroughly analyzing the components of the Union and 
Confederacy’s conduct, we will come to a new and more comprehensive understanding of the 
nature of the Civil War - what it began as, what it became, what it meant to people, and why it 

















 Hammer 10 
3. Prelude to War 
While it is highly likely that the reader is familiar with the issues and events that sparked 
the Civil War, the forthcoming analysis will certainly benefit from a brief recapitulation. 
 In a time when individual state power was almost supreme, political power was derived 
from likemindedness. From the outset, states naturally differentiated themselves based on their 
economies, and historical values. States that were established as agricultural colonies, that 
brought enslaved and indentured laborers over to cultivate the fields, developed the same ideals 
and needs. States ill-suited for agriculture, and/or founded as havens from persecution and 
inequality, achieved far more industrialized societies that required entirely different oversight 
than the agricultural states. Nothing better exemplified the differences between the two than 
slavery.  
Slavery was the lifeblood of the Southern economy. An historical dependence on slave 
labor transformed the aforementioned ideals and needs of each agrarian state into a universally 
“Southern” mentality. As the Union grew, territories that were admitted as “slave” states 
inevitably adopted that Southern mentality.  
The question of morality and slavery’s legitimacy as an institution dogged American 
politics from the nation’s inception, and rising abolitionist fervor led Southern idealists to seek 
its protection in the Constitution. One such article of protection was the Three-Fifths 
Compromise, which was vital for Southern states to maintain a competitive balance of power in 
Congress. However, by 1820, Northern and Southern states were continuously at odds over 
federal actions that seemingly favored one side intentionally over the other. Jeffersonian 
Republicans in the North felt the inequalities in representation given to the South by the Three-
Fifths Compromise were no longer tolerable, but the constitutional amendment necessary to void 
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it was likely too difficult to get. So, they went after the next best thing: the very foundation of 
Southern society. 
 During Missouri’s bid for statehood, many Northern Republicans, led by James 
Tallmadge of New York, fought to restrict slavery in the territory, as a lack would likely lead to 
the state developing Northern ideals that would significantly increase its population. Southerners 
feared exactly this, as the North already far surpassed the South in population. According to 
census data from 1820, the populations of the “Northern” and Southern” regions were about 
5,239,667 and 4,398,786, respectively. Of that Southern number, 1,538,022 were identified as 
slaves, leaving a non-slave population of only 2,860,764.8 It is clear why Southern politicians not 
only relied on the Three-Fifths Compromise, but also feared any admission of another “free” 
state, with its associated Northern industrial mentality. The number of Southern representatives 
would otherwise pale in comparison to the Northern number. 
 Eventually, Jesse Thomas of Illinois and Henry Clay of Kentucky brokered a 
compromise that allowed Missouri to enter the Union as a slave state, on the condition that 
Maine, which would boast a much smaller population, entered as free. Additionally, slavery was 
restricted in the remaining territory from the Louisiana Purchase north of the 36-30 parallel. 
While controversial at the time for its literal division of the country along economic and racial 
lines, the compromise did solve an issue that could have escalated dangerously, and it was 
believed to have set a precedent for dealing with similar issues in the future. 
 The Missouri debacle made it clear the South felt extreme pressure to keep their balance 
of Congressional power intact, but the necessity for doing so would not be pushed to the 
forefront until 1832. Most of the time, the industrial North and agrarian South thrived in 
 
8 “Census for 1820.” United State Census Bureau, 
https://www.census.gov/library/publications/1821/dec/1820a.html. 
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harmonious coexistence. In fact, the South had found its own profitable niche, while the North 
competed with an industrialized world that was already years ahead of it, technologically. As 
such, the economic interests of each region did not hinge on the same factors, and did not benefit 
from the same actions. For example, tariffs - such as the 1828 “Tariff of Abominations” - that 
were designed by Northern politicians to protect Northern industry from cheap foreign imports 
greatly burdened the South financially. The country was either subjected to outrageous taxes on 
imported goods and raw materials - some as high as 45% under the Tariff of Abominations, 
which was created by President John Quincy Adams, a Massachusetts native, and enacted by 
noted anglophobe Andrew Jackson - or significantly higher prices for the same domestically 
produced goods and materials. Southern states who relied on foreign goods that were not 
efficiently produced in the U.S. could not afford either option. 
Additionally, many Southerners - chief among them being Jackson’s South Carolinian 
vice president John C. Calhoun - felt tariffs like these affected foreign ability to purchase and 
interest in purchasing the South’s primary export, cotton. Difficulty accessing what was once one 
of the largest importers of European goods not only hampered the economies of many nations, 
but also threatened to send them searching for cotton in cheaper, more accessible - if 
comparatively undeveloped - locales, such as Egypt. The predicted damage to the Southern 
economy was immense, leading to the Nullification Crisis of 1832-33 
South Carolina felt especially impacted by the Tariff of Abominations. Considering they 
were no longer one of the main exporting states in the Cotton Belt since the invention of the 
cotton gin, the potential detriment to their economy from foreign pullback was far greater than 
for states that were more productive, like Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi, and states that 
were more economically diverse, like Virginia, whose main cash crop was tobacco, not cotton. 
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Recognizing this, Calhoun anonymously published a pamphlet in 1829 entitled, “South 
Carolina Exposition and Protest.” He invoked the sentiments Thomas Jefferson and James 
Madison expressed in their famous “Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions” in 1798, that the “union 
was a compact of sovereign states… and the federal government was their agent with certain 
specified, delegated powers.” As such, the “states retained the authority to determine when the 
federal government exceeded its powers, and they could declare acts to be ‘void and of no force’ 
in their jurisdictions.”9 Essentially, Calhoun targeted the constitutionality of the Tariff of 
Abominations, claiming the power to enact tariffs “is granted as a tax power for the sole purpose 
of revenue, a power in its nature essentially different from that of imposing protective or 
prohibitory duties.” Because of its expressed protectionist intent, Calhoun argued in his pamphlet 
that “the protection of one branch of industry at the expense of others… is unconstitutional, 
unequal, and oppressive, and calculated to corrupt the public virtue and destroy the liberty of the 
country.”10 
Calhoun thought this was enough to warrant nullification. Though no legislative action 
was taken by any Southern state, Jackson’s administration sought to relieve some of the unrest 
by implementing a new tariff in 1832 that reduced the duties of its predecessor by roughly 10%. 
South Carolina remained unimpressed. The state’s leadership revisited nullification, and Calhoun 
vacated the vice presidency to become a senator, a position that would allow him to better defend 
nullification in Congress. On November 24, 1832, a special convention called by the South 
Carolina legislature issued the “Ordinance of Nullification,” which declared the Tariffs of 1828 
and 1832 “null, void, and no law, nor binding upon this state, its officers or citizens.”11  
 
9 “Nullification crisis.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/nullification-crisis. 
10 South Carolina Exposition and Protest. 1829. 
11 Ordinance of Nullification. 1832. 
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Determined the preserve the Union, Jackson issued his “Proclamation to the People of 
South Carolina,” which declared “the power to annul a law of the United States, assumed by one 
state, [is] incompatible with the existence of the Union, contradicted expressly by the letter of the 
Constitution, unauthorized by its spirit, inconsistent with every principle on which it was 
founded, and destructive of the great object for which it was formed.”12 South Carolina began 
preparing for military intervention in the wake of the proclamation, declaring their intent to 
secede if such intervention occurred. This prompted Congress to pass the Force Bill, authorizing 
Jackson to send troops to enforce the tariffs in South Carolina. Jackson also informed the South 
Carolinians that secession was treason, and would be dealt with accordingly. Simultaneously, 
Congress enacted a new tariff - dubbed the “Compromise Tariff” and proposed by Calhoun and 
the same Henry Clay - that would reduce duties to 1816 levels over the next decade. South 
Carolina was appeased, likely realizing they stood no chance either combating the tariffs in court 
or combating the U.S. Army, and no further major action was required to settle the issue of 
nullification. 
Nationalists revered Jackson as a hero for his navigation of the crisis, but “Southerners 
were made more conscious of their minority position and more aware of their vulnerability to a 
Northern majority as long as they remained in the union.”13 The Nullification Crisis greatly 
strained the federal government’s relationship with South Carolina, in particular, and inflamed 
the debate about federal jurisdiction versus states’ rights. Often, all it took was for Southern 
states to band together in the face of perceived injustices. While South Carolina acted alone on 
the issue of nullification, the debate that raged as a result engulfed the nation. 
 
12 Proclamation to the People of South Carolina. 1832. 
13 “Nullification crisis.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/nullification-crisis. 
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In an attempt to empower individual states and settle the persistent issue of slavery’s 
expansion, Henry Clay and Illinois senator Stephen A. Douglas forged the titanic Compromise of 
1850. In addition to reorganizing the territory gained from the annexation of Texas and Mexican 
Cession, the principle of “popular sovereignty” was invoked to allow the people of each new 
territory to decide if it would be free or slave. While the debate was prompted by California’s bid 
for admission as a free state, proslavery politicians were placated by a new and improved 
Fugitive Slave Act tacked onto the compromise that made the returning of runaway slaves to 
their states of origin a federal responsibility. While leaving the decision of making new states 
free or slave to popular vote worried Southerners about the continued security of slavery, they 
achieved valuable ends for the moment with the Fugitive Slave Act and New Mexico and Utah 
enacting slave codes that paved the way for slavery in those territories. 
The complacency would not last long, however. “The precedent of popular sovereignty 
led to a demand for a similar provision for the Kansas Territory in 1854,” and the “application of 
the new Fugitive Slave Act triggered such a strong reaction throughout the North that many 
moderate antislavery elements became determined opponents of any further extension of slavery 
into the territories.”14 The exploits of prominent abolitionists like William Lloyd Garrison, 
Harriet Beecher Stowe, and Frederick Douglass furthered the perception of slavery as an affront 
to civilized society, and the institution was now being attacked from three angles. Firstly, it was, 
as discussed above, a wholly unfair Congressional advantage for slave-holding states. Even 
though the North’s population continually superseded the South’s, any addition of another slave 
state threatened to reverse that. Since the freeman population in the North was negligible 
compared to the slave population in the South, it was argued that slaves were an entire class of 
 
14 “Compromise of 1850.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/event/Compromise-of-1850. 
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people whose existence was illegal in the North, therefore constituting an impossibility for the 
two regions to be principly equal. This was an atrocious and, to many, unconstitutional 
legislative misstep that needed to be rectified. 
Secondly, attacking slavery weakened the South’s internal power and stability. “Northern 
attacks on the institution were regarded as incitements to riot among the slave populations - 
deemed a dire threat to white southern security.”15 The promotion of slavery to a constant topic 
of national discussion began to arouse a sentiment in the general population that it was a matter 
that needed to be dealt with, swiftly and permanently. Hopefully, such discourse would reach the 
ears of the slaves themselves, and incite a riot here and there that would portend the 
implausibility of continued enslavement. Unfortunately, the most prominent slave revolts, such 
as Nat Turner’s in 1831, had little immediate effect in the North, and supremely negative effects 
in the South, such as the implementation of anti-literacy laws and the raising of white militias to 
defend against future riots. 
 Lastly, it was morally wrong. Even at the time of the Missouri Compromise, Northern 
politicians “rooted their antislavery arguments, not in political expediency, but in egalitarian 
morality.”16 Garrison’s abolitionist newspaper The Liberator, Stowe’s bestselling 1852 novel 
Uncle Tom’s Cabin, and Douglass’ various autobiographies and orations made the stories of the 
injustices of slavery more accessible for the general public, and finalized the transplant of the 
debate from the halls of Congress to the taverns, streets, and homes of America. Proslavery 
politicians fought the changing tide any way they could. 
 
15 Wilentz, Sean. “Jeffersonian Democracy and the Origins of Political Antislavery in the United States: The 
Missouri Crisis Revisited.” The Journal of the Historical Society, vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, p. 383. 
16 Wilentz, Sean. “Jeffersonian Democracy and the Origins of Political Antislavery in the United States: The 
Missouri Crisis Revisited.” The Journal of the Historical Society, vol. 4, no. 3, 2004, p. 387. 
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 Though he was not publicly pro- or antislavery, Stephen Douglas sought to quell the 
rising tension by introducing the Kansas-Nebraska Act into Congress in 1854. The act formally 
organized the Kansas and Nebraska Territories, which were portions of the Louisiana Purchase 
located above the 36-30 parallel. The act also effectively repealed the Missouri Compromise, and 
replaced its slavery restrictions with popular sovereignty. While this technically allowed for the 
territories to vote themselves free if they wanted, the act was seen as “a capitulation to the 
proponents of slavery,”17  and inspired the newly-formed Republican Party - an entity different 
from the Jeffersonian Democratic-Republicans mentioned above - to establish antislavery as 
their primary platform. Soon, large elements of pro- and antislavery citizens migrated to the 
Kansas Territory to claim the state free or slave, and engaged in a long period of bloodshed 
known as “Bleeding Kansas” to drive the other from the territory. This opened the floodgates of 
violence as legitimate means to settle the issues that arose in the confrontations between 
Northern and Southern mentalities, leading to further episodes of bloodshed, like John Brown’s 
raid on Harpers Ferry. 
 The seeds of discontent sowed decades ago with the Missouri debacle were now 
blossoming with unprecedented fervor. The entire country began to operate in a day-to-day state 
of conflict, with common folk taking matters into their own bloody hands, and politicians 
working tirelessly to settle the issues in the House, Senate, and Supreme Court. It was never 





17 “Kansas-Nebraska Act.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/topic/Kansas-Nebraska-Act. 
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4. The Secession Crisis 
In short, it was Abraham Lincoln’s election to the presidency in 1860 that finalized the 
secession of the Southern states. The Republican Party had shown indefatigable resolve in their 
mission to restrict the expansion of slavery, and was beginning to develop distinctly abolitionist 
aspirations. Their surprising success in the Election of 1856 - their candidate, John C. Frémont, 
won eleven of sixteen “Northern” states, despite losing overall to the Democrat, James Buchanan 
- foreshadowed a long and arduous fight for the South to protect their livelihood. They 
essentially resolved to secede from the Union if a Republican president was ever elected, 
faithless that such a man would understand and support their interests. 
The time to put principles to the test came sooner than anticipated, thanks in equal 
measure to Lincoln’s charisma and vision, the Republicans’ fervor, and the Democrats’ utter 
disintegration over the issue of popular sovereignty. Stephen A. Douglas was the obvious 
candidate for Northern Democrats, who generally viewed popular sovereignty as the ultimate 
mutual concession on slavery’s expansion. A senator from Mississippi named Jefferson Davis 
led the Southern Democrats in nominating John C. Breckinridge, Buchanan’s vice president. 
Where Buchanan failed to address the issue of slavery in either direction, Breckinridge was an 
ardent Southern opponent of restricting slavery in territories before they became states under true 
federal jurisdiction.18 While these men were strong candidates individually, the splintering of the 
Democratic Party, especially in the face of such Republican unity, consequently splintered 
Democratic votes into too many camps. The Republican Lincoln won handily. 
The president-elect was given no time to lay out his plans for the country. On December 
20, 1860 - only about a month-and-a-half after Lincoln’s election - another special convention 
 
18 “John C. Breckinridge.” Encyclopaedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/biography/John-C-Breckinridge. 
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assembled by the South Carolina legislature made good on the Southern threat, unanimously 
passing an ordinance of secession. 
It is unsurprising that South Carolina was the first state to secede from the Union, given 
their tempestuous history with the federal government. In their secession document, they decreed 
that “the frequent violations of the Constitution… by the Federal Government, and its 
encroachments upon the reserved rights of the States, fully justified this State in then 
withdrawing from the Federal Union.” They invoked the philosophical principles from the 
Declaration of Independence that “whenever any ‘form of government becomes destructive of 
the ends for which it was established, it is the right of the people to alter or abolish it, and to 
institute a new government.” The “destruction” rendered was the failure of the federal 
government to enforce the Fugitive Slave Clause in Article Four of the Constitution. Increasing 
“hostility” directed towards the institution of slavery by free states “has led to a disregard of their 
obligations” that the federal government neglected to rectify. For years, the hostility remained at 
the state level, but now the federal government directly involved itself by electing “a man to the 
high office of President… whose opinions and purposes are hostile to slavery,” and aimed to 
place slavery, the foundation and necessity of Southern economy and livelihood, “in the course 
of ultimate extinction.” This threatened the rights of the individual state to control its own 
institutions and regulate its property. These perceived Constitutional violations, and the overall 
“current of anti-slavery feeling,” led to the state to formally secede from the Union.19 While the 
legitimacy of South Carolina’s claims that states’ rights were neglected/violated continues to be 
debated, the above “feeling” they regarded was enough to inspire six other states to secede by 
 
19 Declaration of the Immediate Causes Which Induce and Justify the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal 
Union. 1860. 
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February 1861. The Confederate States of America was then officially formed, with Jefferson 
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5. The Motivational Impact on Strategy 
 The preceding background was necessary because Groves’ prior-discussed analysis of 
Phillip II and Elizabeth I demonstrates that motivations matter in the formation of strategies. 
They not only provide valuable context for a faction’s aims, but also insight into their state of 
mind, and another opportunity to find similarities with other factions from other wars. For 
example, Phillip’s bureaucratic judgment was clouded by the belief that he was a singular 
instrument of God, while Elizabeth was motivated by nothing other than the desire to preserve 
her kingdom, a decidedly more specific and practical end than spreading Catholicism to an entire 
continent. Phillip’s goal was also far more offensive in nature, requiring the processing of more 
information than his administration was capable of - how to combat numerous different 
opponents in unfamiliar conditions, how to institute and govern a religious empire larger than he 
had experience with - whereas Elizabeth only had to worry about defending her realm from one 
attacker. 
 In summary, conditions birth the requirements for success, and motivations shape 
conditions. Therefore, it is prudent to examine the conditions of the Union and the Confederacy 
rendered by their motivations on the eve of the war. 
 The tragedy of the Confederate States of America began similarly to how the Articles of 
Confederation nearly destroyed the infant United States in 1787. From its earliest iteration, the 
C.S.A. lacked a coherent strategy. It was at once a proud institution that derived legitimacy from 
how cooperatively it formed, and one that was afraid to consolidate power in a central body. It 
lagged in forming a standing army, and allowed its states to conduct themselves however they 
pleased. For instance, South Carolina instructed its militia to drive any remnants of U.S. armed 
forces from the state. In January 1861, they fired on the civilian steamship Star of the West, 
which was transporting troops and supplies to the federal Fort Sumter in Charleston Harbor. On 
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April 12, the militia, commanded by the viciously passionate General P.G.T. Beauregard, fired 
on the fort, officially igniting the American Civil War and inspiring four more states to secede to 
round out the infamous eleven Confederate States. 
 However, the states did not initially plan to go to war with their former nation. A self-
acknowledged “agricultural people,” they claimed, as a body, to seek “peace and commerce with 
all nations.”20 As evidenced by South Carolina’s secession document, the majority of states 
believed historical precedent would legitimize their venture, the way the Declaration of 
Independence and Revolution legitimized the United States. They hoped Unionists would reach 
this understanding and leave their territory with minimal shows of force. Bloodless separation 
would be achieved. However, Davis simultaneously insisted that “it is by abuse of language that 
[the South’s] act has been denominated a revolution,” stressing the foundational right to dissolve 
ties to their oppressive former government differentiated the current situation from that in 
1776.21 Their secession was not a revolution, and they only wanted “to be left alone.” 
 Their actions suggested otherwise. Nevermind their pursuit of “huge swaths of territory 
belonging to a number of other powers, particularly the Union,” it was South Carolina’s 
bullheaded attempt at scaring the U.S. away that proved Southerners severely overestimated their 
opponent’s willingness to capitulate, and “wanted to foment revolution against the U.S. 
government.”22 They acted brashly - a trait common to Beauregard’s exploits - forcing the 
C.S.A. into a conflict it may not have wanted, and leaving it racing to raise a provisional army, 
and solidify its regular armed forces.  
 
20 Davis, Jefferson. “Inaugural Address.” Confederate States of America President Inauguration, 18 February 1861, 
Alabama State Capitol, Montgomery, AL. Inaugural address. 
21 Davis, Jefferson. “Inaugural Address.” Confederate States of America President Inauguration, 18 February 1861, 
Alabama State Capitol, Montgomery, AL. Inaugural address. 
22 Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
p. 21. 
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To that end, they amassed a formidable army of passionate, able-bodied volunteers led by 
an impressive assortment of Mexican-American War veterans and West Point elites, such as 
Robert E. Lee, Thomas Jackson, Joseph E. Johnston, and James Longstreet. Roughly 80% of the 
adult white male population of the Confederacy of suitable age flocked to join the cause, 
translating into nearly 900,000 men. While the Union army featured a greater number of men 
serving over the course of the war - about 2.8 million - the “soldierly traditions of many of [the 
South’s] people” offset the disparity. Davis boasted that Southerners were “a military people… 
perhaps we are the only people in the world where gentlemen go to a military academy who do 
not intend to follow the profession of arms.”23 As such, Southern armies required less extensive 
training than their Northern counterparts, allowing them to achieve great victories early in the 
war. 
However, Davis and the Confederacy knew military might would not be enough to defeat 
the Union’s vast economy and nearly limitless capacity to produce munitions and recruit troops. 
By 1860, “there were 128,300 industrial firms in the United States,” of which the Confederate 
states combined for only 18,206. The South’s industrial output “was but 7.5 percent of the 
American total,” and the North’s agricultural production technically outweighed the South’s, 
especially once skilled white farmers and laborers were taken from the frontier and placed in the 
Confederate Army.24 To eliminate these obstacles, the Confederacy sought assistance from 
abroad, politically, militarily, and financially. In the end, Southern success hinged on foreign 
intervention. Even as the war unfolded in ways impossible to foretell, this reliance never 
changed. 
 
23 Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
p. 24.  
24 Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
pp. 23-24. 
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That being said, there was much to be optimistic about at the outset. Faith in the Southern 
cause would keep morale high. They also knew the war would likely occur primarily on 
Southern soil, given how the U.S. capital - the end-all target of the Confederate military - was 
basically in the South. Victory felt so close, and the idea that they were defending their homeland 
added a new dimension to the cause. They were also established on the land, while the Union 
would have to expend a lot of resources to construct, maintain, and protect its communication 
and transportation lines into the South. Any additional requirements for Union victory were 
always welcomed by the Confederacy. 
The North felt optimistic because of all the ways it was superior to the South. Their arms, 
equipment, fortifications, and capacity to manufacture each were of a higher grade. There was a 
comforting belief that no single battle could wipe out the Federal Army, as well as the 
knowledge that they required little beyond the aid they could provide internally. This made 
foreign diplomacy an aspect of the war the Union did not need to address. It could concentrate on 
what was happening at home, and if the war found itself running longer than anticipated, it had 
the resources to fight it. 
Moreover, the South made a point of assigning explicit motivations to their secession, 
inextricably linking them to slavery for the duration of the war. Never could they have retracted 
their association with the institution, even if they had wanted. Not only was it an economic 
necessity upon which their value to other nations depended, it was also specifically identified as 
the reason for their pulling away from the United States. It was what differentiated “Southern” 
and “Northern” culture, and upon what the entire Confederacy was premised. The association 
was so psychologically ingrained in the Southern people, and the peoples of Europe, as their 
foundation that it could never have been truly eliminated. The overall Southern strategy can be 
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characterized as rigid - rigid in its motivations, rigid in its inherited circumstances, rigid in its 
consequential requirements for success, and rigid in the decisions made during the war. There 
was a pervasive sense of sameness; Confederate leaders often found themselves falling prey to 
an inability or unwillingness to adapt and change. 
 Meanwhile, there was no true Northern equivalent to the secession documents, nowhere 
they needed or wanted to enumerate their intentions and motivations. The closest thing was 
Lincoln’s inaugural address, which, while certainly powerful, was not intended to be such a 
formal precedent. The very natures of the Union’s goal - reunification - and its motivation - 
secession being illegal and unviable - were broad, and allowed the war to be fought however 
needed. The Union was not constrained by economic necessity, philosophy, or foreign 
perception. How and for what reasons it waged war never contradicted its goal, and never 
violated the premise of the United States. As a result, the South had to wage war on far more 
fronts than the Union, and it was the ability to singularize its focus and adapt its strategy that 
enabled the Union to exploit Confederate vulnerability more than any single military victory. 
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6. War and Diplomacy in 1861 
 When further conflict became unavoidable after Fort Sumter, both sides strove for a 
quick resolution. The South was ever conscious of its inherent inferiorities, and the lingering 
possibility that foreign aid would not manifest. They simply could not sustain a decade-long 
fight - as Robert E. Lee himself mused it could last25 - on their own. If they were unsuccessful in 
securing aid, they would need to win the war sooner rather than later. A quick victory would also 
help cement their legitimacy on the world stage. 
 The North, on the other hand, worried that a prolonged war would wear down the general 
public and tear the fabric of society apart, irreparably harming the people’s faith in the viability 
of the Union. This made even overall victory seem too costly if the war lasted too long. It needed 
to end far more quickly than it began. 
 Union strategy in the first year of conflict was focused on incapacitating the Confederacy 
in a single stroke. Lincoln successfully implemented a blockade of Southern ports that would 
progressively weaken the C.S.A. economically. The Commanding General of the U.S. Army, 
Winfield Scott, introduced his famous “Anaconda Plan,” which would extend the blockade and 
send 60,000 troops down the Mississippi River to conquer New Orleans. At the same time, it 
would serve as a diplomatic effort to stir Unionists in the South to counterrevolt.26 It was deemed 
infeasible because of the fragility of the Unionists’ footholds in the region, but elements of its 
framework were enacted in various ways throughout the war, showing Lincoln’s willingness to 
revisit ideas when the situation allowed. It also showed the staggering transition of Union leaders 
from diplomatic preservationists to warmongering traditionalists in a matter of months. Before 
 
25 Stoker, Donald. The Grand Design: Strategy and the U.S. Civil War. New York, Oxford University Press, 2010, 
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fighting broke out, the president had espoused predominantly preservationist rhetoric, hoping to 
halt secession and negotiate the return of the Southern states. He sought to maintain the status 
quo and assuage Southern fears that his election doomed slavery. In his first inaugural address, 
Lincoln said, “There has never been any reasonable cause for such apprehension. Indeed, the 
most ample evidence to the contrary has all the while existed and been open to their inspection. It 
is found in nearly all the published speeches of him who now addresses you.” Further, he had 
“no purpose, directly or indirectly, to interfere with the institution of slavery in the States where 
it exists. I believe I have no lawful right to do so, and I have no inclination to do so.”27 His stance 
ultimately had no effect, and it would obviously change, but it was the closest the Union came to 
employing diplomacy at the beginning of the war. 
On the other side, the only hope the South had to counter Northern superiority was to 
obtain foreign aid, particularly from European superpowers like Great Britain and France. 
However, in May 1861, one month after the confrontation at Fort Sumter, Britain formally 
declared its neutrality in the conflict to protect its economic interests. By declaring favor for 
either side, they stood to lose the “55 percent of foodstuffs imported each year” from the U.S., 
and “the South’s share of three quarters of the British market for raw cotton.”28 Recognition of 
the Confederate States of America as an independent nation would ensure a war with the United 
States, costing Britain the industrial and agricultural benefits of the North, while likely making 
their cotton trade with the South a target of military intervention. If they sided with the Union for 
some reason, they would effectively forfeit the entire cotton trade. “Stop the cotton trade and 
 
27 Lincoln, Abraham. “First Inaugural Address.” United States of America Presidential Inauguration, 4 March 1861, 
U.S. Capitol, Washington, D.C. Inaugural address. 
28 Paterson, Thomas, et al. American Foreign Relations: A History, Volume 1: To 1920. Cengage Learning, 2009. 
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England’s economy would allegedly collapse.”29 Thus, Britain sought to protect both interests, 
and declared its neutrality. 
Initially, this did not matter. The Union entered July 1861 with the mentality that the 
Southern armies were composed of angry farmers bringing their own guns with them into battle, 
not trained soldiers armed by the finest Northern factories. The sheer lopsidedness in skill and 
size all but guaranteed a decisive victory at the first engagement and a quick mop-up job in the 
aftermath. The South would be re-enveloped, and the healing could begin in earnest. With an 
“urge” for “instant and vigorous action… Lincoln forced Scott to mount an offensive aimed at 
Manassas, Virginia,” 30 as it seemed to be the most “militarily feasible” foothold in the South at 
the moment. Northern sentiment was so assured of victory that the forthcoming battle was 
advertised, and civilians from Washington, D.C. traveled to the battlefield to spectate. 
Simultaneously, troops massed in the Shenandoah Valley, attempting to cut off communication 
between the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia and Richmond, their capital. President 
Davis demanded his primary generals in the East, Beauregard and Joseph E. Johnston, commit to 
“a vigorous attack” that would drive the Union army “across the Potomac,” and “by threatening 
the Capitol… compel the withdrawal” of their forces in the Shenandoah.31 The Confederacy 
engaged the Shenandoah Union troops, only to learn of a larger Union force moving on 
Manassas Junction. Johnston and Beauregard met Union general Irvin McDowell there, with the 
intention of not only pushing him back, but showing the North they were in for a tough and 
unsure fight should they choose to wage war against the Confederacy. 
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Perhaps it was the heat of a Virginian summer day. Perhaps it was the gallantry of 
General Thomas Jackson, who stood like a stone wall in the face of an overwhelming Union 
advance. Most likely it was the surprising equivalence in skill of the two armies that startled 
McDowell into retreating. Much the opposite of what had been touted by proud Unionists, the 
Federal Army present at Manassas was as hastily assembled and poorly trained as their 
counterparts. All the South needed was one advantage then, and they found it in ferocity. General 
Jackson ordered a bayonet charge to drive back the Bluecoats, and the guttural cry emitted by his 
troops that became known as the “Rebel Yell” shocked the Union so much, they ran all the way 
back to Washington. It was a humiliating defeat for the North that would shake up the very 
foundation of their army. General Scott retired from service in late 1861, and was replaced with 
the infamous George B. McClellan. 
Though humbled, the Union’s resilience in the face of defeat and the appointment of 
McClellan signaled to the Confederacy a need to revive diplomatic efforts in Europe. They were 
in for a long fight, but were hopeful the rousing victory at Manassas changed attitudes in Great 
Britain and France. Perhaps an ultimate Confederate victory now seemed more plausible. James 
Murray Mason and John Slidell were dispatched as envoys, with tall orders to secure recognition, 
military intervention, and, at the very least, financial backing. They departed from Cuba on the 
British mail steamer RMS Trent, after a long and winding journey from the Southern states to 
evade capture by the Northern blockade. On November 8, 1861, the U.S. sloop-of-war San 
Jacinto, captained by Charles Wilkes, intercepted the Trent and arrested Mason and Slidell on 
the grounds that they were contraband of war. The two envoys were imprisoned in Boston, and 
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the country rejoiced, having “longed for a man who would do, taking the responsibility of the 
doing.”32 Wilkes seemed to be that man. 
This rejoicing was indicative of the mostly forlorn sentiment Americans had towards the 
war in its early days. Continued defeats after Manassas, however small, weighed heavy on the 
public, and many prominent figures in the North seized the opportunity to revitalize public faith 
in their cause following the capture of the Confederate envoys. Most notable was Richard Henry 
Dana Jr., a Boston lawyer who was deemed “as high an authority on maritime law as there was at 
the American bar.”33 The author of the cited article practiced law in the office of Dana Jr., and 
had a “vivid recollection of the day when the news of the seizure was flashed to Boston.” Dana 
Jr.’s face reportedly “lighted up, and, clapping his hands with satisfaction of the tidings, he 
expressed his emphatic approval of the act, adding that he would risk his ‘professional reputation 
on its legality.” Adams added that “this was the view universally expressed and generally 
accepted.” Indeed, Dana Jr. would later state in the Boston Advertiser: “In the present case, the 
mission [of the two envoys] is in its very nature necessarily and solely a mission hostile to the 
United States. It is treason within our municipal law, and an act in the highest degree hostile 
within the law of nations. If a neutral vessel intervenes to carry such persons on such a mission 
she commits an act hostile in the same degree.”34 Furthermore, former Secretary of State and 
Minister to Great Britain Edward Everett, a figure “than whom no one stood higher in general 
estimation as an authority on topics of this character,” contributed: “You see that there is not the 
slightest ground for apprehension that there is any illegality in this detention of the mail packet; 
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that the detention was perfectly lawful, the capture was perfectly lawful, their confinement in 
Fort Warren will be perfectly lawful.”35 
 Predictably, Great Britain protested the seizure of the Trent and the arrests of Mason and 
Slidell. They asserted that “the ‘Trent’ was not captured or carried into a port of the United 
States for adjudication as prize, and, under the circumstances, cannot be considered as having 
acted in breach of international law,” and that “the conduct of the United States’ officer 
commanding the ‘San Jacinto’... was illegal and unjustifiable by international law.”36 U.S. 
violation of maritime laws and intentional seizure of a British vessel were feared to be catalysts 
for a war between the two nations. In a letter dated December 16, 1861, former president Millard 
Fillmore warned Lincoln against inciting this separate conflict, saying, “[If] we are so 
unfortunate as to be involved in a war with her at this time, the last hope of restoring the Union 
will vanish, and we shall be overwhelmed with the double calamities of civil and foreign war at 
the same time, which will utterly exhaust our resources, and may practically change the form of 
our government and compel us in the end to submit to a dishonorable peace.”37 Lincoln 
understood this, and soon released Mason and Slidell to rectify the situation. The two remained 
Confederate envoys and departed for Britain once again in January 1862. 
 Fillmore’s letter best outlined the ramifications foreign intervention would have on the 
war, and why the Confederacy so desperately pursued relations with Great Britain and France. 
The Trent Affair best outlined the early iterations of the Union’s shapeshifting strategy. When 
the opportunity arose to stifle Southern diplomacy, the North seized it. When the opportunity 
arose to lift the public’s spirits by parading the captured envoys as prizes of war, the North 
 
35 Adams, Charles Francis. “The Trent Affair.” The American Historical Review, vol. 17, no. 3, 1912, pp. 540-562.  
36 Baxter, James P. “Papers Relating to Belligerent and Neutral Rights, 1861-1865.” The American Historical 
Review, vol. 34, no. 1, 1928, pp. 77-91. 
37 Fillmore, Millard. “To Abraham Lincoln.” 16 December 1861. 
 Hammer 32 
seized it. When such behavior threatened to drag Great Britain into the fight, the North retracted. 
Meanwhile, the Confederacy was enslaved to its inability to seek anything but foreign 
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7. March - August, 1862 
Historians cannot seem to agree on how to characterize George McClellan. Many paint 
him as paranoid and indecisive, pointing to his correspondences with his wife where he 
expresses his feelings of being undermined by Lincoln and doubts about the trustworthiness of 
intelligence on Confederate troop numbers. He always anticipated far greater forces than were 
present, and consistently delayed offensives because he felt undermanned and underprepared. 
Others call him patient and strategic. He masterfully transformed his army into fighting shape, 
and was perpetually scheming “a decisive use of the Army of the Potomac that could lead to a 
Union victory in the war.”38 While he shared Lincoln’s desire for a quick end, he did not share 
his aggression. He eventually developed “a deep contempt for the president,” and would often 
refuse to share his plans, exhibiting no intention of conducting decisive military operations in the 
near future.39 In response, Lincoln issued “General War Order No. 1” on January 27, 1862, 
which instructed all land and sea forces to advance by February 22. In the West, Ulysses S. Grant 
complied and captured Forts Henry and Donelson on the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers in 
quick succession, but McClellan still did nothing. Enraged and disheartened, Lincoln removed 
McClellan from his position as Commanding General, relegating him to commanding only the 
Army of the Potomac. Eventually, McClellan embarked on his infamous Peninsula Campaign in 
March 1862.  
For nearly five months, the Army of the Potomac and the Army of Northern Virginia 
fought across southeastern Virginia, every day inching closer to Richmond. In early June, 
General Johnston, commander of the Northern Virginia, was severely wounded and replaced by 
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Robert E. Lee, catalyzing a dramatic shift in the Confederacy’s military outlook. Where Johnston 
matched McClellan’s caution and patience, Lee rampaged against the Union army, commanding 
some of the most awe-inspiring and brutal victories ever seen on a battlefield. McClellan was 
stunned by Lee’s fury, and withdrew with impressive losses. Having successfully defended 
Richmond and humiliated the Union, Lee felt the time was ripe to go on the offensive again. 
 As he pressed north, Lee decimated his foes in battle after battle. The Union Army of 
Virginia, commanded by General John Pope, was nearly eradicated at the Second Battle of 
Manassas in late August 1862. The war had now been going on for over a year, and the Union 
was still being defeated on the same principles it had been all war. Everything about the two 
armies were opposite. The brilliant commanders the Union lacked the Confederacy had in 
spades. The lack of emotional investment in the North trembled before the Southern “cause.” 
The rapidity of Lee’s momentum north consistently caused the Union to overestimate his 
numbers, and if the occasion arose where a general was courageous enough to underestimate, 
they were massacred. Meanwhile, the dashing Confederate cavalry commander General J.E.B. 
Stuart taunted, prodded, and utterly confounded Union communications, and consistently 
secured actionable intelligence for Lee’s army, even by accident. Stuart commenced a raid of 
Pope’s headquarters in Virginia so he could get back his favorite plumed hat and cloak that had 
been captured in a prior Union attack. During the raid, Stuart also happened upon some 
communications regarding reinforcements coming to meet Pope around the time he was moving 
on Manassas Junction. Luck was on the Confederacy’s side, and it had seemingly abandoned the 
Union entirely. That was about to change. 
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8. Antietam and the Emancipation Proclamation 
The Union was desperate entering the fall of 1862. The primary army separating 
Washington from the Confederates had been obliterated, and Lee was relentlessly pushing his 
way north. While McClellan’s army could return in time to defend the capital, Lincoln 
understood the troops and citizens were becoming disillusioned with the high cost and low return 
of the war. He knew he had to target the emotions of those with whom war was waged. He had to 
spur the nation’s belief in the cause of unification, to convince them they were fighting for 
something greater than themselves.  
The likelihood of a Franco- or Anglo-Confederate alliance was never greater than in the 
fall of 1862. Defeat after defeat only made the North look incompetent and the South 
increasingly legitimate to these powerful European nations. A weakened and disheartened United 
States was a boon to all who competed with her in the industrial market. Moreover, the 
Confederacy was exacting retribution that Great Britain and France felt was well-deserved. The 
general sentiment in the North was that these powerhouses were eager to join the fray and finish 
off one of their nemeses, and Lincoln’s rhetoric to dissuade foreign involvement lacked authority 
and confidence to that point. Faced with this possibility, and growing pressure from abolitionist 
leaders like Frederick Douglass to transform the war into a “remorseless revolutionary 
struggle,”40 Lincoln realized he could kill two birds with one stone: dismantle any chance of 
foreign aid to the Confederacy, and stoke the abolitionist fires in the North that would continue 
to fuel the war effort.  
European abhorrence of slavery, from the leadership to the general citizenry, was well-
known. It was likely one of the reasons the nations with the biggest axes to grind with the U.S. 
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were hesitating to throw their weight behind the South, Lincoln thought. Open support for a 
“nation” whose very foundation was the institution of slavery would not sit well with the 
citizens, and cause unnecessary protest at home. Denouncing slavery and moving towards 
legislation against the institution was a powerful card to have in his deck, but Lincoln knew if he 
played it too early and without significant authority, the act would seem desperate and grasping. 
The denouncement needed to feel completely independent of the war, as if it were something 
Lincoln would have sought even if the Union had stayed unified. If it felt like just another ploy 
to weaken the Confederacy, it would have no effect. It needed to appear to come from the heart, 
and for that to be the case, the Union needed to appear to be able to win the war without it. Sure, 
General Grant had commanded several successful campaigns along the Mississippi, but the 
battles raging around the capital drew the most attention, and none of them lent the authority 
Lincoln needed to make his proclamation. 
Enter Special Order 191, a Confederate dispatch issued by General Lee detailing the 
intended movements of the Army of Northern Virginia after they had penetrated Maryland and 
begun their campaign towards Washington. Lee opted for a roundabout route to D.C. after 
Second Manassas through Maryland so he could sever the railroad line between Washington and 
Baltimore, rendering the state useless to the Union and surrounding the capital on all sides with 
Confederate-held territory. It was a solid plan, and historians seem to agree that Lee probably 
had the momentum to pull it off. However, Special Order 191 was left behind by a member of 
Northern Virginia’s intelligence staff, and was found later by resting Union troops. Of course, 
the order could have been assumed to be a misdirection ploy, but McClellan authenticated it and 
was able to halt the Confederacy’s advance at South Mountain and Sharpsburg, a little town on 
the bank of Antietam Creek. After a ferocious battle that resulted in approximately 23,000 
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casualties, the Army of Northern Virginia was driven from Maryland, wrestling with the 
strategic ramifications of failing in its first attempt to invade the North. 
 However, the battle was tactically a draw. Both armies suffered enormous losses, and 
even after receiving reinforcements once the battle had concluded, McClellan failed to capitalize 
on Lee’s struggle to cross the Potomac and essentially allowed the Confederate army to escape 
when it could have been easily destroyed. McClellan’s indecision caused him to miss out on his 
vaunted “decisive use of the Army of the Potomac,” and he was not given field command again 
in the war. 
 Despite the missed opportunity to truly end the war, Lincoln felt the perceived Union 
victory was just what he needed to add weight to his denouncement of slavery. On September 22, 
five days after the battle, he drafted the Emancipation Proclamation. It was continuously revised 
and advertised until it was officially issued on January 1, 1863. The document acted as both an 
excellent denouncement of slavery aimed at foreign powers, and a “fit and necessary war 
measure for suppressing [the] rebellion”41 that would doubly inspire the citizens of the Union. 
Ironically, the issuance would occur mere days after yet another humiliating Union defeat 
at Fredericksburg, but this only seemed to lend credibility to the Proclamation because it flew in 
the face of adversity. It was issued of its own accord, damning military circumstances. It also 
damned the Confederacy. As Lincoln predicted, Great Britain and France reneged on any support 
cultivated by Mason and Slidell. The Prime Minister of Great Britain at the time was Lord 
Palmerston, a staunch opponent of the United States, but an even stauncher opponent of the slave 
trade. He recognized the U.S. as an up-and-coming threat to Britain’s global power, and felt a 
Confederate victory would not only weaken America’s global stature, but also open a vast 
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market in the Confederate States for British manufacturing. Palmerston personally supported the 
Confederacy, but, like much of the British government, feared the civil unrest that might come 
from openly supporting a slave-holding entity. France felt the same way, as both nations had 
outlawed slavery in the last thirty years. Palmerston, himself, abhorred the institution. When 
Lincoln issued the Proclamation, it closed the door on physical intervention by a foreign power 
on behalf of the Confederacy.42 
 Straying from the point of this thesis for a moment, it is generally accepted that the Battle 
of Gettysburg, which will soon be discussed, was the so-called “turning point” in the Civil War. 
While this is not unwarranted, it can be contended that the single battle with the most influence 
on the course of the war was Antietam. Gettysburg’s significance is augmented by Grant’s 
simultaneous capture of Vicksburg, Mississippi. Antietam stood on its own. It marked radical 
shifts in the perception of the conflict. Lee’s aggression was shown to be faulty, and he hesitated 
on invading the North again for a while. McClellan’s indecision cost him his job, leading to a 
revolving door of generals commanding the Army of the Potomac for the next year. Lincoln 
successfully planted the seeds that would alter the entire perceived aim of the war. Those seeds 
would blossom with his Gettysburg Address in November 1863, and the fight for unity would 
become a fight for liberty. 
 This is the prime example of the evolving Union strategy. Lincoln promised the 
preservation of slavery in his inaugural address, hoping such domestic diplomacy would temper 
the South. He then adopted a traditional military mindset, seeking to squash the rebels on the 
battlefield. When that proved too difficult, he abandoned preservationism and welcomed 
emancipation in states “in rebellion against the United States.”43 It was at once a piece of 
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domestic and foreign diplomacy, a measure beyond the battlefield that truly influenced the war. 
Because it had not attached itself to any specific motivation at the outset, the Union was able to 
fluidly transition between whichever motivations suited its purpose. The ultimate goal of 
reunification remained, but the means to achieve it were beginning to change consistently. 
 Likewise, the Confederacy’s link to slavery proved to be the downfall of its bid for 
foreign aid. Its economic dependence on slavery meant it could not abandon the institution to 
curry favor in Europe, and its dependence on external intervention or aid could not change 
because of the nature of Southern society. The North was able to exploit whatever opportunities 
arose. The South was not given the same opportunities. 
 Furthering the point, Lincoln had a contingency plan in case the Proclamation was a dud. 
In August 1862, he met with a black delegation and “told his guests that ‘we [the two races] 
should be separated’ and that the only hope for equality rested in their emigration to a new 
land”44 Indeed, Abraham Lincoln, the oft-thought great emancipator, had put into motion a plan 
to deport all free black persons to another land, in an effort to “sweeten the pill of emancipation” 
for all those who did not necessarily advocate for it. In fact, on the same day he was to formally 
issue the Emancipation Proclamation, he also signed “a contract… to use federal funds to 
remove five thousand black men, women, and children from the United States to a small island 
off the coast of Haiti.”45 This plan, developed simultaneously with what would become the 
Emancipation Proclamation, shows the depths to which Lincoln was willing to go to appease 
whom he needed, discourage whom he needed, and scorn whom he needed to achieve his 
endgame. He took advantage of everything, regardless of what form it took - preservation, 
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abolition, or relocation. The president was ruthless, in a sense, but it was that ruthlessness and 
ability to adapt however the situation necessitated that ultimately led to victory, and Lincoln was 
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9. Gettysburg and the Erlanger Loan 
The aforementioned revolving door of generals between September 1862 and July 1863 
was a nightmare for the Army of the Potomac. Ambrose Burnside, a Pyrrhic hero of Antietam 
and the namesake of sideburns, led it to disaster at Fredericksburg in December 1862. He was 
quickly replaced by Joseph Hooker, who had distinguished himself at Antietam and 
Fredericksburg. He, too, led the army to disaster at Chancellorsville in May 1863. George Meade 
was given command at the end of that June, after John F. Reynolds turned down Lincoln’s 
suggestion that he take over. Meade would have likely also led his men to disaster at Gettysburg 
had it not been for the valor of his subordinates like Reynolds, Winfield Scott Hancock, John 
Buford, and Joshua L. Chamberlain. 
Though the defeats at Fredericksburg (approximately 13,000 casualties) and 
Chancellorsville (approximately 17,000 casualties) were two of the most devastating the Union 
would suffer in the war, they were also two of the last. The Union’s ability to withstand these 
defeats is a testament to their vast resources, and willingness to adapt. Though consecutive 
decisions to replace the Army of the Potomac’s commander did not play out favorably, Lincoln’s 
insistence on retooling whenever the situation warranted eventually landed him with the 
successful Meade and the victorious Grant.  
Meanwhile, President Davis superseded Lincoln in personal military experience, but was 
less adroit as a strategic leader.. Lee had demonstrated much success, but also significant failure. 
Still, Davis felt he could not simply replace the beloved general, even when his tactics began to 
grow stale. Meade and his subordinates had well-encountered Lee’s aggression, and allowed the 
Confederate commander to play to his perceived strength at Gettysburg. On day one - July 1 - of 
that fateful battle, General Buford set up his cavalry unit along three ridges just outside of the 
town that was perfect terrain to delay the approaching Confederate infantry until the bulk of 
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Meade’s army arrived and took up defensive positions on even better ground in and around 
Gettysburg. On day two - July 2 - the Confederate advance on the Union’s left flank was halted 
by the valiant stand of Colonel Chamberlain and the 20th Maine regiment on Little Round Top. 
On day three - July 3 - the fabled “Pickett’s Charge” was easily repulsed by a dug-in and 
consolidated Union army behind a stone wall. All three days featured a Confederate offensive 
and Union defensive. All three days saw Union victory. Where generals like McClellan, 
Burnside, and Hooker aimed to meet Lee head-on, Meade and his subordinates understood that a 
defensive coordinated from the start would likely stand a better chance than another offensive, 
especially with Gettysburg’s defensible terrain. The Union, once again, adapted their strategy, 
while the Confederacy did not. Lee remained aggressive; even after two bloody days of virtually 
no progress, he still opted for offense because he had had so much success drawing Union 
commanders into his whirlwind before. Meade resisted the temptation, and ultimately took the 
battle. It was the last time Lee would attempt, or even be able to attempt, an invasion of the 
North. 
 As mentioned in the previous chapter, Grant managed to secure Vicksburg, Mississippi 
the very day after Lee was driven from Pennsylvania, yielding control of the vital River to the 
Union. They firmly had the upperhand in the West, and could now better commit to fighting Lee, 
who had always been their biggest threat. That is not to say the Army of Northern Virginia had 
not seen better days. Ultimately, Lee’s second invasion “fulfilled neither the strategic nor the 
operational objectives its commander set for it.”46 He had hoped threatening Northern territory 
after the significant victory at Chancellorsville would draw the Union out of Virginia, which 
sorely needed reprieve. The state had seen the lion’s share of hard fighting in the war. Its people 
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were exhausted, frightened, and helpless, and its natural resources were so depleted that it took 
considerably longer to import them from elsewhere. However, by July 26, “Lee was already 
writing of his fear that ‘we shall soon have [the Union] back again’”47 in his home state. 
 Numerically, the South suffered between 23,000 and 28,000 casualties at Gettysburg, an 
ungodly number even by this war’s standards. Psychologically, Lee was embarrassed, but 
President Davis and the Southern people did not waver in their support of the beloved Bobby 
Lee. The most notable person to voice dismay about the commander’s lapse at Gettysburg was 
his trusted subordinate, General James Longstreet. He was swiftly transferred to Tennessee. 
Once more, rigidity played a role in the Confederacy’s demise but that will be addressed later. 
 Perhaps the most damning ramifications of Gettysburg and Vicksburg were diplomatic 
and economic. By 1863, the governments of Great Britain and France had declared they would 
not officially involve themselves in the war, leaving the Confederacy floundering for whatever it 
could get. The envoy Slidell found a little more success in Paris than Mason found in London. In 
March, a prospectus for a loan accumulating to approximately $15 million was published by the 
French banking house, Emile Erlanger & Company. The loan was for “Confederate bonds 
backed by cotton” that were redeemable once the war was won.48 This was an attractive prospect 
for many citizens and speculators, and those bonds began to be widely circulated on the market, 
even in Great Britain. Over the remainder of the war, “the South had received [an additional] 
$6,000,000 to aid in their war effort.”49 
 These impressive financials were not undeserved. The Confederate States were still the 
world’s largest exporter of cotton entering the summer of 1863, though Egypt and India were on 
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the rise. Regardless, the price of the bonds hovered between 88% and 92% of their original value 
in the spring and summer,50 respectable numbers for a country in the midst of one of the 
bloodiest wars in human history. “King Cotton” was alive and well. Even more respectable was 
the “42 percent chance of [ultimate] victory”51 European investors gave the Confederacy after 
Chancellorsville, all in spite of the inherent inferiorities and the loss of “Stonewall” Jackson at 
the battle. 
 However, “[news] of the severity of the two rebel defeats [at Gettysburg and Vicksburg] 
led to a sell-off in Confederate bonds”52 that sent their price “tumbling from 89 ¼ [percent] to 60 
[percent].”53 Investors not only felt their cotton tied to the bonds was in jeopardy, but the 
viability of America’s entire cotton enterprise was, as well. In a panic, Europe began to lean 
more heavily on Egypt and India, further depreciating the value of Confederate cotton. The last 
bastion of attainable aid in Europe disintegrated, and the South was left to fend for itself for the 
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10. Grant, Sherman, Abolition, and the End of the Line 
The first half of 1863 culminated more in a Confederate defeat than a Union victory. 
Save for Vicksburg and the tactical expulsion of Lee’s army from the North, there was not much 
to immediately celebrate in Washington. General Meade, like McClellan before him, neglected 
to pursue the retreating Army of Northern Virginia, which “deeply mortified” Lincoln, because 
destroying them would have been “perfectly easy.” He lamented, “Gen. Meade and his noble 
army had expended all the skill and toil, and blood, up to the ripe harvest, and then let the crop 
go to waste.”54 
This botched follow-up was worrisome because Lee had still proven himself to be a 
superior commander to all Union commanders he had faced, and Southern morale had not 
waned. He continuously sought opportunities to contest Meade again, confident he could “crush 
his army while in its present condition.”55 Meade had exploited Lee’s aggression, but Lee now 
understood Meade’s game. He was ready, and situated himself strategically around Richmond, 
hoping Meade’s tentativeness would conflagrate with Lincoln and Commanding General Henry 
Halleck’s demanding pursuit of the Confederates and draw him into an engagement with Lee for 
which he was not prepared. Much to his consternation, Meade resisted the bait, and maintained a 
successful series of clashes with Lee that made no serious dents in either army. What it did, 
however, was put the Union in a position to mount an offensive. 
Entering 1864, there seemed to be only one man in the U.S. Army who had exhibited the 
elusive combination of aggression and success like Lee, and he had been constrained to the 
Western Theater for the entire war. On March 2, Ulysses S. Grant was promoted to lieutenant 
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general, a rank only previously held by George Washington, and given command of the entire 
army. Recently, the chips had fallen favorably for the Union. Lincoln’s “Gettysburg Address” in 
November 1863 firmly established abolition as a war aim. For the first time since his inaugural 
address, Lincoln pleaded directly to the people of the North. He knew the war effort required 
their emotional support, and two bloody victories at Gettysburg and Vicksburg were not enough. 
There needed to be a purpose for the blood that people could resonate with emotionally. 
Abolition became that purpose, but then decisive military action - the kind Meade seemed 
unwilling to provide - was needed to ignite the fire. The tinder and tools were there, but someone 
needed to strike the flint. 
Grant wasted no time. In his first private meeting with the president, he stated his 
understanding that no true victory could be achieved “until the military power of the rebellion 
was entirely broken.”56He had also always known the necessity of the Eastern and Western 
armies working in concert, but had not had the authority to orchestrate that. Now he did, and his 
good friend William Tecumseh Sherman was in charge of all troops in the West. At this point in 
time, there could have been no duo better equipped and more excited to end the war. 
Sherman pushed down from Tennessee and nearly burned Atlanta to the ground before 
cutting a swath 300 miles long to the Atlantic. The state of Georgia was left in ruins, and by 
Christmas 1864, Sherman was able to present the city of Savannah to President Lincoln as a gift. 
The infrastructure of the Confederacy was shredded, and the only formidable Confederate bodies 
left in the country were Joseph E. Johnston in South Carolina and Lee in Virginia. Sherman 
pushed up through the Carolinas against Johnston, aiming to pin the two Confederate armies 
back-to-back, with Grant crushing down from the north. 
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To that end, Grant launched his famed Overland Campaign with the Army of the 
Potomac that relentlessly pushed Lee towards Richmond. In June 1864, the Union laid siege to 
Petersburg and Richmond, enduring nine months of brutal trench warfare in and around the 
cities. It was aggression and ferocity Lee had not witnessed by a Union general, and he was 
wholly unprepared for it. Eventually, Richmond fell, and the Confederacy began its surrender 
after the Battle of Appomattox Court House, on April 9, 1865. The last organized Confederate 
forces surrendered on June 23. 
It was not that Lee was strategically incapable of handling a coordinated Union offense, it 
was that he was not expecting one. For the entirety of the war until March 1864, Lee had been 
fighting against the cautious McClellan, the inflated Burnside, the overconfident Hooker, and the 
defensive Meade. In that time, he consistently had the Union on the run, making it impossible for 
them to counter with anything but defensive tactics. Lee remained rigid in his approach, and it 
eventually cost him.  
After Gettysburg and the gentle poking and prodding of Lee in late 1863, the Union could 
finally catch its breath, and the opportunity arose to mount an offensive. Rather than rest on the 
laurels of Meade, Lincoln capitalized by promoting Grant, whose celebrity lent a heft to 
Lincoln’s persuasion that the war was being fought for something emotionally bigger than 
politics, and victory was within striking distance. Grant’s promotion was as much an emotional 
ploy as a tactical one, and it is the primest example of Lincoln’s quick thinking and willingness 
to adapt to any situation. Where Jefferson Davis and the South always protected Robert E. Lee, 
Lincoln felt no similar duty to his officers, replacing them as soon as they proved contrary to the 
necessary strategy of the Union, eventually leading him to the man that would save the United 
States of America. 
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11. Conclusion 
 When all was said and done, approximately 620,000 men lost their lives, along with a 
countless number of civilian and slave deaths. That toll is still higher than all other American 
wars before and since combined. It is a well-known statistic, but it bears repeating. There is no 
way such a number was achieved by the success and failure of military might alone. Just as every 
aspect of Northern and Southern society was affected by the war, each contributed to its 
outcome. The longstanding blood feud between the Southern states and the federal government 
inspired the people of the South to support the political, economic, and philosophical cause of 
independence. There was no shortage of volunteers taking up arms against the Northern 
aggressors. The general public of the North did not seem to comprehend the detrimental effects 
of Southern secession, and much of their military strength was drawn from official calls for 
volunteers and, eventually, drafts. This provoked disdain for the conflict at the outset. Thus, the 
Confederacy was lulled into thinking it would be a straightforward matter of outlasting and out-
maneuvering the enemy, while the Union was ready to adapt whenever things grew stale. 
 Equipping itself to outlast the U.S. Army was the difficult part for the Confederacy. They 
benefited from fighting on their land and began with a formidable number of troops, but their 
recruiting and manufacturing capabilities were limited. The overall cost of the war was going to 
be more than they could immediately afford. James Mason and John Slidell did what they could 
to lobby foreign aid, but their efforts mostly failed due to the Confederacy’s interminable link to 
slavery. 
In many ways, the South was pigeonholed. Such economic disparity made it impossible 
for them to rely on anything but foreign assistance, and their relations with powerful European 
nations like Great Britain and France depended upon their exportation of cotton. But, cotton 
could not be produced in sufficient quantities without slave labor. The eventual elevation of 
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emancipation and abolition to Union war aims caused those foreign governments to back away. 
The motivations of the Confederacy constricted its circumstances, and its circumstances 
constricted its requirements for success. They also struggled to consolidate their intentions at the 
outset. The desires of each state were simultaneously the same, in that they wanted 
independence, and scattered, evidenced by the clear disparity between President Davis’ 
declarations and South Carolina’s actions. In this way, the Confederacy was both too narrow and 
too broad. While the consolidation did occur and a formidable war machine was produced, the 
war itself would have been delayed, and perhaps altogether avoided, if Fort Sumter had not been 
fired upon. But that is conjecture for another thesis.  
These issues did not exist in the North. They knew their goal from the start. Their 
established industry afforded them flexibility and the peace-of-mind that no single battle would 
likely end the war. If it became a war of attrition, they could play that way. Industrial and 
economic flexibility also allowed for strategic flexibility. Abraham Lincoln did not have to 
worry about obtaining help from abroad, so he could focus on what was happening at home. 
Initially, his strategy was one of appeasement, assuaging fears that he would eradicate slavery 
when elected. When his diplomatic rhetoric did not work, he turned the blossoming war over to 
more traditionally-minded commanders who wanted to begin and end the conflict on the 
battlefield. Lincoln “never wanted to interfere in military matters,” but endured waves of defeats, 
inaction, and public pressure that made his intervention necessary.57 He rotated generals on a 
consistent basis based on what each new situation required. Eventually, he came to the defensive 
George Meade, who happened to strike gold against Robert E. Lee at Gettysburg. Later, Ulysses 
S. Grant would take command of the entire U.S. Army at a time when an offensive was ripe, and 
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would batter Lee into surrendering. When the situation necessitated defense, the Union employed 
it. When the situation afforded offense, the Union - specifically Grant - capitalized. When 
nothing seemed to be going right, Lincoln was not afraid to make changes. 
The same cannot be said for the Confederacy, at least not where it mattered. Lee was a 
brilliant, operationally adept commander, but he became too comfortable with how he achieved 
success against the Union, and remained rigid with his plans until it was too late. He took each 
Union commander for granted - he did indeed seem to face a different one in each contest - and 
did not learn from his mistakes at Gettysburg. He had been too aggressive, and Meade was able 
to implement a coordinated defense from the beginning. Lee never prepared himself thereafter to 
be on the defensive, and that allowed the persistent Grant to exploit his overeagerness. When the 
Army of Northern Virginia was finally backed up against the walls of Richmond, it was not used 
to or prepared for the kind of war Grant was waging. Given their incredible successes early in the 
war, it was entirely feasible for the South to come out on top if the North had not been able to 
rally its people and find the right commanders. However, a few military missteps put more 
emphasis on the Confederacy’s success on other fronts, like foreign diplomacy and economic 
dealmaking. Indeed, Lee’s costly mistakes at Gettysburg ruined the statistical, tangible viability 
of Confederate bonds in Europe. Without external financial backing, more emphasis was placed 
on needing to deal an irreparable blow to the Union army. It was a vicious cycle that was 
impossible to satisfy, where every aspect depended on and contributed to the emphasis of the 
others. It all stemmed from rigidity - rigidity in motivation, rigidity in circumstance, rigidity in 
need, and rigidity in military philosophy. 
The Union had the opposite mentality. There was fluidity from the broadest strategic 
aims - evidenced by the transition from preservationism to abolitionism in three years - to 
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treatment of prisoners of war, like Mason and Slidell. This allowed each aspect of the war to not 
affect the others too drastically. However the war needed to be fought, the Union fought it. 
Whether conscious or unconscious, the mentalities of each entity pervaded their overall 
strategies. No single strength, weakness, or decision determined the course of the war. Each and 
every contributed a string to the web. Each aspect of waging war - military, diplomatic, 
economic, social, philosophical - was considered and developed by the leadership of the Union 
and Confederacy, but not necessarily as a cohesive grand strategy. Grand strategy was not 
popularized as a method of actively waging war until the next century, but by observing the 
methods of both entities through the lens we have come to know as grand strategy, we can 
appreciate the interplay of each aspect in determining the outcome. Approaching the Civil War 
in one aspect and assigning inflated importance to individual people and battles does a disservice 
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